Buy Reason 6 ((BETTER))

If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense, increase by four levels.

buy reason 6

To be sure, Romero also argues, as a matter of law, that the scienter requirement of Sec. 2K2.1(b) (5)-that the defendant have "knowledge, intent, or reason to believe" that the firearm will be used in a future felony offense-should be narrowly interpreted to require that the defendant have subjective knowledge. We review a guideline's meaning and scope de novo. See United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 1993). Romero, however, cites no meaningful authority for his position. At any rate, we need not address this asseveration as, here, the district court supportably found that Romero possessed such subjective knowledge

It's a pity this feature does not exist because the sole reason for moving to Microsoft Store is complete automation. I specially like the Auto Update feature where you can push an update to all users. Generating codes manually moves away from automation.

In an action under R. L. c. 99, 4, by the executor of the will of a woman, for the value of securities alleged to have been delivered by the plaintiff's testatrix to the defendant as margins on wagering contracts, where an auditor found that the testatrix employed the defendant, who was a stockbroker, "to buy and sell securities upon her account upon margin contracts, intending at the time, that the defendant should make actual purchase or sale of such securities as she from time to time ordered," and where it appeared that this finding covered all purchases and all sales ordered by the testatrix including twenty-five short sales of stocks not owned by her when she gave the order to sell, there is evidence warranting a verdict for the defendant; and this is none the less so by reason of a finding of the auditor that the testatrix employed the defendant to "carry for her upon margins such [securities] as were purchased until their sale was ordered," or by reason of a finding that the testatrix "never intended herself to pay the defendant in full for all said purchases, but she intended and contracted that after the defendant had made the actual purchases ordered that he should carry the securities for her upon margin, and sell such as she ordered to be sold or deliver to her any that she might elect to pay for in full."

In an action under R. L. c. 99, 4, by the executor of the will of a woman, for the value of securities alleged to have been delivered by the plaintiff's testatrix to the defendant as margins on wagering contracts, the presiding judge put to the jury two questions as follows: 1. "Did the plaintiff's testatrix intend there should be no actual purchase or sale of the stocks?" 2. "Did the defendant have reasonable cause to believe that such intention existed on the part of the plaintiff's testatrix?" The judge, after some confusion of statement, finally explained the questions correctly and, in answer to an inquiry from the judge as to whether the explanation was clear, the foreman of

the jury said "I guess that is clear, your honor." The judge failed to instruct the jury that if they answered the first question in the negative, they should not answer the second question, but on the contrary there were written beneath the second question the words, "You will answer that also yes or no." To the first question the jury answered, "No," and to the second question they answered, "Yes." They returned a general verdict for the defendant. There had been evidence of certain short sales which under 6 of the statute was prima facie evidence that the defendant had had reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff's intestate, when she gave the orders, intended that there should be no actual purchase or sale. An auditor, who in his report had found for the defendant on the first question, had made no finding on the issue covered by the second question. Held, that under all the circumstances there was nothing in the answer to the second question that tended to show that the jury misunderstood the instructions as to the first question and that accordingly the exceptions to the instructions in regard to the first question must be overruled, and that, all other exceptions having been disposed of, the general verdict for the defendant must stand.

that appears on the account, it is established that that is all that took place. Confessedly if that was all that took place and the testatrix acquiesced in that, it is established that she intended (so far as short sales are concerned) that there should be no actual sale. The short answer is that the auditor found to the contrary. But the more complete answer grows out of the testimony of George, the plaintiff's own witness. From this testimony the jury were warranted in finding that the customary way of executing an order for a short sale is for the broker making the short sale to borrow the stock and to deliver the borrowed stock to the purchaser of the stock sold short in performance of the short sale contract. But this the plaintiff contends as matter of law was not done in this case because there is no statement in the account that stocks were borrowed to make deliveries under short sale contracts. But if the broker borrowed the stocks on delivery to the lender of the market price on the day the stock was borrowed and later on (when the stocks sold short were bought in by him for the testatrix) he delivered the stock so bought in to the lender and received back from the lender the money handed to him when the stocks were borrowed, there would be no sum with which the customer should be finally debited or credited. It was open to the jury to find, on George's testimony and the auditor's finding, that the short sales were actually carried through by delivery of the stock in the usual way by the broker's borrowing the stock and delivering the borrowed stock in performance of the short sale contract. And they were warranted in making the further finding that the reason why the borrowing of the stock (when the short sale was made) and the return of the stock borrowed (when the stock sold short was later bought in) did not appear in the account was because the transaction by its very terms would not and did not result in any sum being due from or to the testatrix and that for that reason it was not stated in the account although it was the fact.

On the conclusion of the charge the following colloquy took place: "Mr. Bigelow [the plaintiff's counsel]. . . : In the second place I want your honor to charge, I don't think you did charge specifically - that the short sales are prima facie evidence of the plaintiff's intent and of the defendant's reasonable cause to believe. The Court: Well, I gave everything that you requested that I thought ought to be given. Mr. Bigelow: Not only that, but we put in the account with the short sales first. If the auditor's report had never come in we should have had a prima facie case on the whole case, and when the auditor's report was read it was not then prima facie evidence on the question of intent or of reasonable cause to believe, because we had evidence - The Court: It would not be profitable to argue those questions. Your rights shall be saved to everything I have not given. Mr. Bigelow: I wish to save my rights, calling attention to those particular points. I want to state further that the short sales must be overcome - the evidence in the prima facie case must be overcome in some way by the defendant's evidence. I except to the way in which that was put. The Court: You can't except because I didn't give except what you have asked me to give. I gave this Mr. Bigelow: Well, so far as it was not given, and so far as you did give it contrary to that. 9, 10 and 11 - you didn't give those, I understand. The Court: 9, 10 and 11 - no, I didn't give those."

We take up the tenth and eleventh requests for rulings. When this case was last before this court (Chandler v. Prince, 217 Mass. 451), it was decided that the defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed that the auditor's finding that the necessary intent on the part of Mrs. Colburn did not exist overcomes the prima facie case arising from short sales. In that connection it was said that the prima facie case made out by the finding of the auditor and that made out by short sales are in the nature of conflicting evidence prima facie in character, that it cannot be said as matter of law that one kind is stronger or weaker or equal to the other; "The evidence is to be considered as a whole and the truth ascertained as in other cases of contradictory evidence." In one respect the charge of the judge went further than the opinion in Chandler v. Prince, ubi supra, and dealt with a matter not there considered by the court. The presiding judge told the jury that "When that case was tried before the auditor that presumption [arising from short sales] existed, what effect he gave to the evidence on the one side and on the other I can't say, but he came to the conclusion after hearing all the evidence - I assume, taking into consideration that assumption [sic] - he came to the conclusion that there was an intent on her part to purchase, to have these stocks actually purchased, and that there was not an intent on her part that they should not be purchased." And later on he said: "I want to repeat to you again a presumption of law which was before the auditor, that the fact, if it be a fact, that the plaintiff's testatrix did not have in her possession these stocks - some of them at any rate - if you find that to be a fact, when the sales were made, it is presumptive evidence that she did not intend that actual sales should be made." We are of opinion that this was correct. For these reasons the exceptions taken to the refusal of the judge to give the ninth, tenth and eleventh rulings asked for by the plaintiff must be overruled. 041b061a72